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5 A detailed case study of unusual 
routines 
This chapter and Chapter 6 describe how each of the five propos-
itions played out in a lengthy field study at an educational institution 
(Cooper, 2000), based upon our working model of unusual routines 
introduced in the preceding chapter. While the initial intent was 
to focus on the effects the implementation of a computer-mediated 
communication system (one kind of ICT) might have on URs, the 
early data collection suggested that the study would provide broader 
insights into UR dynamics in decision processes and operations. The 
study utilized depth interviews with a stratified purposive sample of 
organization members, and such qualitative methodology often does 
lead to pleasant surprises in the knowledge the study generates. That 
is to say, the study convinced us that the model had broader applica-
tion than to ICTs alone, and had particular analytical value in under-
standing the relationship between problematic routine behaviors and 
organizational culture. It is important to emphasize that in no way 
was this intended as an assessment or critique of communication at 
the site! Indeed, we expect that the URs and interaction scripts sur-
faced in the study may be all too familiar to our colleagues at other 
institutions. 
Method 
The research site 
At the time of the study, the organization had just begun a major end 
user computing initiative to implement a shared database of student 
records, and to provide email to all faculty and staff. Up to that point, 
college records had been maintained on a mainframe computer by 
an information technology (IT) department. To obtain needed infor-
mation from these records, administrative units requested a report 
from the IT unit. A common complaint was that these reports were 
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out-of-date by the time they are received, particularly budget figures. 
(See Gasser, 1986, pp. 213-14 for similar examples of computer slip.) 
Units frequently devised their own recordkeeping systems as a work-
around to the centralized IT function, and with most workarounds, 
these systems were unique to each department. There had been no 
way to share this locally-generated information across units, other 
than printouts or telephone inquiries. 
Inclusive decision-making was an important organizational value 
for the university, and was clearly evident in most initiatives. Some 
issues spawned task forces or study groups, most often at the college 
president's directive. The membership of these ad hoc work groups 
was carefully chosen to broadly represent various constituencies with 
an interest in the issue. Other issues were considered in an elaborate 
college governance system which had been in place for more than a 
decade at the time of the study. All constituencies on the campus were 
represented on a number of standing committees, and all organiza-
tion members had voting rights in the general meetings. The charter 
of this permanent body specified that its decisions were advisory to 
the president and board of trustees and therefore not binding, and 
there was some disagreement about how much weight the governance 
body's decisions actually carried with the executives. 
In all these decision processes document sharing, document edit-
ing, or other group work tended to be paper- and face-to-face meet-
ing-intensive. In short, there was a great deal of collaborative work 
being done, but without much use of electronic communications to 
facilitate it. 
Data collection 
Given the exploratory nature of the study, the data collection 
employed semi-structured interviews with organization members. 
These interviews asked the informants about their personal use of 
computer-mediated communication (hereafter referred to as ICT), 
their department's use of ICT, about aspects of their daily activities 
which they perceived as frustrating or negatively impacting their job 
performance, and about organizational values which the informants 
saw as affecting decision processes. 
The second author had worked in higher education for a number 
of years and had often been involved in group decision-making and 
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the writing of policy documents. Over time, he had formed personal 
impressions of interaction patterns which often appeared in those 
collaborative activities, yet struck him as problematic in their effects 
on the decision process. These suggested to him five categories of 
interaction scripts (digressing, trivializing, reframing, scapegoating, 
and expanding; related to some of Bardach's (1977) implementa-
tion games) which might be associated with URs, and were used as 
prompts in the interview. He read the brief descriptions and asked 
the informants if they were reminded of group decision processes in 
which they had participated. The names of the scripts, in italic type-
face, were solely for the interviewer's convenience in taking notes 
and were not read to the informants! Table 5.1 provides the interview 
guide. 
Table 5.1 Interview guide 
Involved in the [ICT] implementation? 
If so, describe involvement. 
Do you use email, or any other kind of computerized communication? 
Does the XYZ Department use email, or any other kind of computerized 
communication? 
Recognize any scripts? (Any context at the college, group or 
interpersonal.) 
Digressing: 
"Nostalgia"- Consideration of a problem is sidetracked by reminis-
cences of times when the problem was non-existent or less pressing, or 
speculation how a former leader would have handled it. 
Trivializing: 
"I Have a Concern" -A minor objection or concern (in comparison to 
the potential benefit of the proposal under consideration) stops fur-
ther consideration of a particular course of action. Put another way, a 
small objection blocks a promising idea. 
"The Microscope" -Discussion narrows to a small detail or aspect of 
the question. Time is used up in consideration of minutiae, rather than 
the central problem. 
"Every Proposal is Wrong" - An objection or concern (sometimes triv-
ial) is attached to each of a number of proposals under consideration. 
No proposal is decisively eliminated, and none gains a consensus. 
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Table 5.1 (cont.) 
Reframing: 
"The Larger Issue"- The question at hand becomes tied to another, 
broader issue, and discussion gravitates toward that issue. 
"Change the Agenda"- The issue is reframed so that the discussion 
moves away from the initial question. 
Scapegoating: 
"Kick the Dog"- A weak consensus builds around problem definition, 
but not around a concrete solution or course of action. Blame is placed 
on a person or department not present at the meeting and over whom 
the group has no control. 
"Piling On"- Problems are attributed to a person or department which 
has already received criticism regarding another issue. 
Expanding: 
"We Haven't Heard All the Voices"- An actor objects that some party 
was not adequately consulted or advised about the issue. The legitim-
acy of the group process is undermined. 
"Nobody Asked Me"- An actor objects that he or she was not 
adequately consulted or advised about the issue. The legitimacy of the 
group process is undermined. 
"Everybody's a Winner"- Disagreements over problem and/or course of 
action are resolved by inserting every party's language in document. 
Can you think of other patterns, in discussions at the college? 
Can you think of things that happen at the college that are negative, 
counterproductive or dysfunctional in some way, yet continue to hap-
pen repeatedly? 
Are there any core beliefs or values at the college which interfere with 
discussion or collective decision-making? (at any level: college-wide, 
departmental, small group) 
Can you think of times when someone's words seemed inconsistent with 
what you thought they really intended? 
Sampling 
Informants were selected to represent the major academic divisions 
of the college and levels in the administrative structure. The intent 
was to obtain a purposive, stratified sample (Miles and Huberman, 
1994, pp. 27ff.) of the organization members across the subunits, 
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based on the supposition that position within the organization might 
affect the informant's experience both with URs and with the system 
implementation. When the interviews within these strata revealed 
critical events or key players, snowball sampling was used to obtain 
data from the individuals directly involved in the ICT implementa-
tion, or individuals who seemed to play some key role in a UR. 
The organizational chart suggested three major functional 
strata to be sampled, each containing a number of defined sub-
units: administration, faculty, and operations. There was a good 
degree of embedded complexity since each functional stratum con-
tained members of different union bargaining units, and because 
subunits within a particular stratum varied considerably from each 
other in the degree to which they had adopted the new system at 
the time of the study. 
Analytical method 
In the early stages of the data collection, it became apparent that there 
often were sharp differences in the informants' perspectives on the 
interaction patterns we call URs. For instance, some informants saw 
the elaborate group decision processes as problematic, both in the large 
amounts of time and effort required to come to closure and in the per-
::eived quality of the decisions emerging from them. Other informants, 
by contrast, felt that although such deliberations might become tedi-
ous they were vital to maximize the inclusiveness of the group. At first 
glance the perspective difference seemed to be between administrators 
and faculty - a group conflict endemic to academic institutions! - but 
as the data collection went on it appeared more as individual differ-
ences in orientation toward the product of the interaction (i.e., the deci-
sion), or toward the process (i.e., the deliberations) - in other words, 
between the content and the relational dimensions of interactions. 
As is the case in much qualitative research, the analysis in large 
measure emerged from the interview data. Coding the interviews 
for references to URs, subroutines, and indicators helped to reveal 
their dimensions and dynamics. The details of the coding are omit-
ted here for the sake of brevity. Space limitations likewise prevent a 
detailed exploration of the interviews, but the balance of this chapter 
is intended to give the reader a sense of how indicators of URs and 
their subroutines surfaced in them. 
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Proposition One 
If a new ICT mitigates or exacerbates URs it does so not simply as a 
more efficient channel (the first-level effect) but also as an innovation 
the organization must process (the second-level effect). 
The system as just a new computer: the first-level effects 
Many informants expected the new ICT to produce first-level changes 
in such procedures as distributing class rosters to faculty and report-
ing grades to the registrar, but anticipated little impact on the organ-
ization beyond that. A senior faculty member and department chair, 
expected the email capability to make little difference in his/her sub-
unit's operations. 
Int: Does anybody in your department use email? 
I really don't know. I know none of us have access to it on our own com-
puters [i.e., at work], so if they use it they use it at home. 
Int: Are there any plans that you know of? 
Yes. We got new computers in the summer and we're wired or almost 
wired, and they tell us we'll get it shortly. 
Int: Do you have any thoughts on what you personally or the department 
as a group might do with email? 
I don't see any great advantage to email. I think we probably could talk 
with publishers, book reps, other faculty in other colleges, set up meetings 
and conferences. I don't see internally - I don't know, maybe because we 
don't have it, you know, we haven't gotten to use it, but - urn, you know, 
we're so close to each other, I mean, I don't see where email is any great 
benefit to improve our communication. 
More than just a new computer system: second-level 
effects on the social system 
Some informants did see the ICT implementation as at least an oppor-
tunity for, if not a catalyst of, second-level changes in the social order 
of the organization. An interesting example of such changes in the 
interactions among organization members surfaced in the interview 
with an upper-level administrator who had been heavily involved in 
the planning of the new system and had already noticed second-level 
change beginning in the social interactions. 
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The first stage of the system implementation consisted of adapting 
a commercial software product, marketed to higher education insti-
tutions in general, to this specific institution. To this end, the col-
lege began a wide-ranging effort to solicit input from organization 
members at all levels about both their existing work methods and 
new functionality they might want the system to deliver. It became 
the task of the project team to fit the practices and preferences of 
the organization into the capabilities of the software. In a sense, the 
new computer system was simultaneously a template which could to 
a limited extent be adapted to the existing social system, and a force 
in itself which pressured the social system to change in particular 
directions. (This is a bit stronger than Barley's (1986) observation 
that technology implementations are occasions in which restructur-
ing can take place, and a common analysis of ICT implementation by 
socio-technical practitioners and researchers.) This informant saw the 
implementation as actually compelling the social system to change, 
and seemed to intuitively recognize this structurational dimension of 
the implementation work: the committee was tasked with optimizing 
the functionality of the ICT, and simply took it as a given that there 
would be changes in the social system as a result. 
We have not gotten into discussions of, "well- this is going to cause a change 
in this group's job description; we need to t~lk to Human Resources." We're 
not interested in doing that. That's not the point of this. That's Human 
Resources' problem; they need to deal with the way the jobs change after 
the jobs have changed. So we're not changing people's jobs ... we're simply 
saying, "this is the system." 
Beyond the expectation of long-term second order effects, this 
informant also noticed immediate changes in the interaction patterns 
among organization members. The implementation work brought 
together people from different functional units which had tended to 
be only loosely coupled, an effect also noted in Aydin and Rice's study 
of a university healthcare unit (1992). 
First, this has been the most startling, wonderful kind of experience. We 
had a group of people sitting around a table who had never sat around a 
table before ... really didn't know each others' functions .. . The human 
resources, payroll, and the finance people really thought of themselves as a 
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unit unto themselves and were surprised by the input they got from people 
who were on those implementation teams who came from educational ser-
vices, because they thought. they knew everything about it. So that was 
another big change. 
Besides simply bringing about face-to-face interactions among 
people from different units, the design work also required that cer-
tain issues be settled expeditiously and that the solutions be uniform 
across the institution. Although the selection of codes, field names, 
and symbols in a database might seem a relatively trivial technical 
detail in a system implementation, it generated a surprising amount 
of controversy in that the need for uniformity forced a tighter degree 
of subunit coupling than had been typical at this institution (as also 
found by Aydin and Rice, 1992). The effort spent in resolving such 
questions is an indicator of the degree to which such tight coupling 
went against the grain of culture. 
[B]ut that [conflict over codes for departments] was another one that was a 
lengthy discussion, and part of it is just understanding that in an integrated 
system you can't just not take into account what's going to happen within 
the other departments and the other areas of the college. 
[T]he jurisdiction over a code is a very important thing but there has to 
be an agreement to maintain it, and so all of those discussions which are 
things that they tried to have us do with regard to the mainframe, but it 
was always fragmented, and this has brought about a real communication 
amongst the people, and we're not fragmented half as much as we were. 
From an administrator of a unit that had already implemented the 
ICT, there were also some early indications of changes in the norms 
for communicative behaviors, such as increased responsiveness to 
messages, follow-up to meetings, density of communication interac-
tions, and awareness of external information resources. 
An interesting example of a blame subroutine surfaced in the inter-
view with a member of the information technologies group. This 
informant's duties included performing maintenance and set-up work 
on desktop computers. S/he had, in the past, often received criticism 
from end users that the department had failed to perform the work 
the client had requested, criticism the informant viewed as sometimes 
A detailed case study of unusual routines 163 
unwarranted or even unethical. With the email function of the ICT 
becoming available at the college, this informant began using email to 
document the maintenance requests, which was a noticeable change 
from the informality with which much interdepartmental communi-
cation had been handled in the past (also noted in Romm's studies of 
political uses of computer-mediated communication systems, 1998). 
Int: What use does your department make of email for business? 
Bu$iness? .. . I use it as a great defense mechanism. 
Int: Defense? 
I get it in black and white. I get my ass chewed off a lot around here 
because of lying. Users tell me that they want one thing, we go and do it, 
and they say that's not what they want. And so I make a lot of things come 
in black and white now. 
Int: You mean, requests for your assistance or your services? 
Yeah. Requests for certain modifications, systems to be redone, things of 
that nature. So I use it as a defense system. I get it in black and white, and 
certain people don't like to do that in black and white. I've been bitten in 
the ass a lot of times, and I've learned from it, and so I use it for that. I use it 
when I want to get my point across, and I want it out in black and white. 
In this informant's view, one dimension of the problem was that 
there were often simple misunderstandings between end users and 
computer support personnel about the details of such technical 
work, fostering delay or error subroutines. Beyond that, however, the 
informant felt there were times when clients falsely accused his/her 
department of incompetent work, interactions characteristic of blame 
subroutines. 
Int: So your experience was - you used the word, blame. I'm getting the 
sense that you would do what people said. 
Yes. 
Int: And then they would accuse you, or blame you, or fault you. 
Yes. 
Int: For it not turning out the way they liked, later on. 
Yes. Exactly. Saying, "This isn't what I really meant," or "This isn't what 
I told you." And that's when it comes to the point where it's actually a lie, 
in my book. So I use it a lot for that. 
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The system as a catalyst for policy change: a major 
second-level effect 
Some informants saw a relationship between the ICT implementa-
tion and policy changes occurring at this time. The change in the 
college's grading policy is the most dramatic example of such second-
level change the informants attributed, at least in part, to the new 
computer system. 
For several decades the college had used a somewhat non-
traditional system of reporting course grades and calculating 
students' cumulative averages. The grading system had been contro-
versial for some years prior to the ICT implementation, with many 
philosophical and practical objections to the existing system, yet 
proposals to adopt traditional grading had repeatedly been voted 
down in the college governance forum and the grading system had 
remained unchanged. About six months into the deployment of the 
new system, the college president made a speech to the college com-
munity: to announce that because the state had altered its funding 
formula in such a way that the nonstandard grading system would 
significantly disadvantage the college, the board of trustees had 
made an executive decision to change to a traditional grading sys-
tem. The president was forming a special commission to draft the 
specific policy for that system, which then would be presented for 
discussion in the governance forum. 
There were several striking differences from the earlier initiatives to 
change the grading system. The impetus for the change was an event 
in the organization's environment, while earlier debates had arisen 
internally, driven by some parties' dissatisfaction with the old grading 
system. The decision to change had been made at the executive level 
by the board of trustees, rather than proposed in the collegial govern-
ance system and voted on in that body. The commission charged with 
drafting the language of the new grade policy had an expeditious 
timetable in which to complete its work, in contrast to the open-ended 
discussions and committee work characteristic of the earlier propos-
als in the college governance. 
Int: I want to make sure I understand. At Governance Day you watched a 
videotape of the college president, and the college president said the grad-
ing system is going to change, by such-and-such a date, I guess? 
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Got to. He said, these are reasons why it has to change, and we've got 
to start talking about it and got to start making decisions about what we 
want to do. 
Int: And the reason why is ... ? 
There's a couple reasons. One is [the new ICT] ... [I]t would be very 
difficult for [the new ICT] to adjust to our [current] grading system. 
Another is - if I can recall now - the state has some performance-based 
budgeting, and so the way they measure performance is based upon 
grades. 
The rapidity of the change and its general acceptance by the college 
community was striking, given the previous resistance of the old sys-
tem to change. As this quote illustrates, a number of informants felt 
that while the state funding formula made adoption of a traditional 
grading system inevitable, the ICT implementation was at least a cata-
lyst in this major change. 
Much more than just a new computer system: second-level 
effects on value chains 
Although a bit unorthodox, it can be useful to think of sequences 
of operations in an academic institution as value chains. Students 
often must make their way through. a sequence of procedures within 
their academic institution as they matriculate, register for classes, or 
qualify for graduation. Typically th~se procedural steps require con-
tact with a number of different subunits within the school. As noted 
above, these subunits may be quite loosely coupled with the result 
that costs are externalized on the students in the form of work, delay, 
or error subroutines. (Or, if- sadly -the result is a deficiency in the 
student's academic performance, the cost may be externalized on his 
or her later employer or graduate schooL) 
The head of a large academic service unit expected the new ICT to 
change the procedural steps of the value chain including his/her unit. 
At the time of the interview, the unit sent students out to a special-
ized department for testing of their reading and computational skills, 
but s/he anticipated the ICT would make it possible to perform this 
testing within the unit. On the surface this may seem to be a simple 
first-level gain in efficiency, yet this informant intuitively recognized 
the potential for second-level change as the system altered the control 
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over and availability of this, and other, procedures, effectively alter-
ing subunit boundaries in the process. 
[A]ll of a sudden as things come on line, newer people and people across 
the organization laterally are going to have the capacity to do things that 
were more restricted to one or another office, so we might deliver the test-
ing right in our own office for example, rather than sending [the students] 
to the testing office. 
Another informant who worked on the design of the human 
resources and payroll functions of the new system also observed how 
the new system was the catalyst for changes in subunit boundaries, 
such as greater decentralization, a potential threat to some depart-
ments, such as administrative services, which had controlled access 
to financial information. This suggests that a general organizational 
inertia may be an accumulation of subunit-level change resistance. 
A high-level administrator, not directly involved with the imple-
mentation, made a very interesting link between the distribution of 
power in the organization and the distribution of knowledge. 
The technological systems that we talked about earlier, that will make 
some things less secret, that information will really be public and shared, 
rather than held and controlled as power by people on lower levels, some-
times, of the organization. All of those things, I think, will help. I think 
the technology, the good budget, the pattern and participatory bargaining, 
a very clear performance evaluation system that's viewed positively, that 
rewards initiative and performance. All of those things would help. 
It is quite interesting to note that s/he envisioned new flows of 
information upward with the implementation of the new ICT, and 
looked forward to a broader sharing of information replacing the cur-
rent proprietary, localized control over information. Typically, organ-
izational studies presume or conclude that power is concentrated in 
the upper levels of the organization (see Morgan, 1986, pp. 280 ff.). 
While there may be some basis for that generalization, it is worth not-
ing that when certain knowledge is confined to the "shop floor," cer-
tain kinds of organizational power are likely to be vested there, also. 
This quote from a practicing executive in an educational institution 
reminds us that it is often more accurate to say that (at least some) 
power is concentrated where the knowledge is concentrated, and not 
necessarily where the organizational chart suggests authority lies. 
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Another administrator hoped for double-loop learning occasioned 
by the new ICT. This informant viewed the practice of holding meet-
ings as a work subroutine: 
Well, I think there's just too much time spent in a given week, sitting in 
meetings in this room or the trustees' dining room, or wherever, when the 
only reason you're meeting is because it was on the schedule. I mean, essen-
tially what you get at the meeting you could have gotten in your email. And 
because of people who aren't there, you don't know what they think about 
it. And if they could respond to the group through email, then everybody 
would have everybody else's reactions. 
I'm not saying do away with meetings, but I'm just saying that I think 
we need to look seriously at how to make better use of all this networking 
we've done. I mean, what did we spend? How many millions of dollars on 
a fiber optic network and an email system, a computer on every desk? It's 
not that I just want to sit at my desk and do email all day, I don't mean that 
either. But I think that we should use that facility to inform us. 
I mean, every once in a while this phrase, the "learning organization," 
comes up. And I think that's the first step to being a learning organiza-
tion: learning how to use information technology to get the information 
you need to learn. And I don't think we're doing that well enough. I think 
we've got the physical infrastructure in place ... 
Int: Why is it, do you think, that we're not doing that if the plumbing, the 
infrastructure is in place? 
We're too busy going to meetings. 
Proposition Two 
Loose coupling between subunits in a value chain allows URs to 
resist change. 
The difficulty of managing a loosely coupled structure 
One problem administrators face in an academic organization is that 
of matching resources to needs. A particularly difficult boundary 
management (Johnson and Rice, 1987, pp. 165 ff.) problem involves 
obtaining or allocating resources outside the administrator's span 
of control which are necessary to managing activity within his or 
her responsibilities. Two dimensions of special interest here include 
(a) the way subunits can interact as if loosely coupled when their 
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functionality is highly interdependent, and (b) the ways institutional 
values and politics can preserve URs. 
An administrator who worked in the enrollment and registration 
unit described an example of this kind of problem. His/her unit gen-
erated enrollment data as classes filled up, and s/he was hence in a 
good position to assess the fit of resources (in this case, open sections) 
to demand (in this case, students wishing to register for classes). The 
decision to open new sections where there was unfilled demand, how-
ever, was made elsewhere in the organization. 
We send regular reports to all of the division chairs, division administra-
tors, and department chairs, tracking what level of activity there's been 
in their class[es]. We send it on two different levels ... [Redacted], from 
recruitment services, will do a daily enrollment report which will track, in 
essence, program by program. So for people who are on top of this - and 
some are and some aren't- they'll look at this very closely ... We open new 
sections, potentially. 
Int: When you say, "we," who's the we? 
Urn ... it would ultimately be the division that would initiate it, but we 
would be the ones that .would spur that, feed them the information that 
they need to do that ... 
Int: Your unit generates the intelligence about where there's the great-
est demand and where there's slack demand, and where you need more 
resources, in this case meaning more open sections. 
Exactly. 
Int: You yourself don't create new sections. 
Correct. 
Int: But you send the information that there's a potential need or a poten-
tial surplus over to the division, which means to the academic side. They 
actually make the decision. 
Correct. 
Int: You don't have direct control over that. 
No. We don't. 
It is not problematic in itself that this informant's unit identified 
undersupplied courses but could not generate more sections; resources 
are always insufficient in (especially public) universities. Also, cer-
tainly this information could, in principle, stimulate an appropriate 
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response in another subunit within the organization. However, this 
was not always the case, even when the mismatch between demand 
and supply was chronic for certain courses required for students to 
graduate. What does seem problematic at the conceptual level is that 
the subunit which created the supply/demand intelligence and the sub-
unit which opened new sections were so loosely coupled. That the 
mismatch was a systemic and even regular occurrence, and not an 
exceptional situation, indicates this is a UR. 
[Redacted] generates reports on a section by section basis, so people can 
track ... each individual section and know from that, basically, when 
they may need to open new sections ... [T]hat's the intelligence that they 
need to determine what they should be offering next year. They should 
be looking at how quickly are these filling up, are we forcing people into 
extension centers because there's no more on-campus sections. I look at 
those also, in what have traditionally been problem areas and gatekeeper 
areas. 
And, again, to give you an example of what this dilemma is, we've had 
an ongoing issue over English 121. It's probably the most illustrative one I 
can give you. English 121 is what we call a gateway class. Basically, every-
one's got to take that. We've had a real problem over the years monitoring 
the number of sections of English 121 -and there's like sixty, seventy sec-
tions that we offer- and having enough for our students to get in. 
Int: You usually don't have enough sections? 
We generally run out ... We run into logistics issues, we run into political 
issues - and they're significant. 
Int: Political? 
Well, we've had some very, very serious ongoing debates ... in terms of 
holding off because they were looking to increase the number of full-time 
permanent faculty. And we were saying, "hire adjuncts," and they were 
saying, "we can't get enough competent, qualified adjuncts to do those 
sections." 
Int: Let's see if I understand you specifically. They did not want to put 
more adjuncts in the stable or on call, because they felt that would under-
cut their stated need for full-time positions. 
Correct. Correct. 
Such a UR externalizes its cost onto third parties (in this case, stu-
dents who cannot obtain the courses they want), and can be quite 
resistant to change. 
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Loose coupling and change resistance 
Informants whose jobs involved transaction processing often voiced 
frustration with routine procedures that were problematic for them, 
yet resisted their best efforts to change them. An informant who 
worked in the registrar's office described a longstanding difficulty 
s/he experienced with late registration of international students. A 
few points are worth noting in this passage. First, the costs of this 
UR were externalized onto the students in the form of a error sub-
routine involving their registration and financial aid. Second, despite 
personnel changes and repeated efforts to resolve it, the problem 
persisted. Third, the informant, in non-technical language, attrib-
uted the problem to loose coupling between the subunits involved 
in this process. 
Int: You indicated that there's some difficulty with the international stud-
ies students. 
Yup. We swear that there's a virus in the files ... It makes no difference 
who is in charge at international studies. They just can't give us what we 
ask them. And it's just an oddity, I have no idea what it is. It's not that 
hard. We're very clear. We've been writing down what we need and when 
we need it, and it's really the timeliness that's the problem. We should not 
have students going abroad who haven't registered yet, and that happens 
Int: Now, the management has changed a couple times ... 
That's what I'm saying! That's why I say it has to be in the files. It's not 
the people [laughs]. 
Int: Have you checked the water cooler? [laughs] 
[laughs] It's a very odd situation, very odd. And the thing that happens is 
that if a student has not registered and has not been formally accepted into 
the program they don't qualify for financial aid which in the case of inter-
national students comprises loans. And without those loans most of the 
students cannot afford to be in a foreign country. And so there's all of this 
last-minute stuff that is really mean to the students 
The fact is that financial aid is in a tizzy, because now they're here [the 
students], they want their loan papers approved, and they've [financial 
aid] never seen them before. So there's all of this stuff that is just done so 
poorly 
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And that one is just a puzzle, and it truly is as if there's something in the 
animal of international studies that just doesn't allow itself to see itself as 
part of the institution. 
Another administrator saw loose coupling creating coordination 
problems across the entire organization: 
Well, it would be a lot easier if people who worked here knew what other 
people did. And I think that's a big part of the problem. Accounting really 
doesn't know what goes on in the division office. Receiving really is not 
aware of what goes on in a division office. I'm really not aware of what 
goes on in community development. 
If we had an understanding of what the other areas did maybe we would 
be more cooperative, because there's a lot of territorialism, there's a lot 
of, "that's not my job, I'm not going to do it" ... So I think if we under-
stood what the other people did a little better it would make everybody's 
life a little easier. Payroll wouldn't insist on ridiculous deadlines, account-
ing wouldn't insist on doing things in a certain way if they knew how it 
affected us. 
These examples illustrate the wide array of change-resistant func-
tional problems which can be related to loose subunit coupling and 
high levels of subunit autonomy. It is also interesting to note the blame 
subroutines which had arisen as a consequence of those longstanding 
problems. While increased communication is often suggested as a pal-
liative for such coordination problems among subunits, it is not always 
clear exactly what kind of communication would be most valuable or 
how more of it would alleviate those problems. (Chapter 7 discusses 
feedback problems in greater depth.) 
The system implementation and subunit coupling 
An administrator in the IT group provided an interesting example of 
how the system implementation had begun to precipitate a tighten-
ing in subunit coupling. A number of points are worth noting in this 
passage. The new shared database required a higher degree of coord-
ination among subunits than had been the norm, and activity related 
to the implementation was bringing some conflicts to the surface. It 
appears that the mechanism for defusing these conflicts had in the past 
been a blame subroutine with the blame directed at the mainframe IT 
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department, which the new system was going to replace with erid user 
computing. 
A good example - I know it's going to come up soon -is, as we go around 
to different departments and explain what it's [i.e., the new system] all 
about and how interaction has to go on between departments, and com-
munications - which just is not there. One department is going to affect 
another department by what they're putting into different fields, and how 
they're going to cooperate on the database. 
Int: That's because the data is shared, right? 
Yes; And I just see how different departments say, "No, this is how we want 
it. We really don't care about them." And vice versa. "No, my department's 
more important than that department." Well, it's going to be interesting when 
Big Blue [i.e., the mainframe] gets finally pulled, which is very soon. 
Prior to the implementation of the shared database, subunits were 
for the most part free to choose their own software packages since the 
electronic data generated within the unit were used only within that 
unit. The introduction of a shared database prohibited that degree 
of subunit autonomy, and we can see both the ICT implementation 
beginning to precipitate a localized tightening in subunit coupling, 
and a notable resistance to this change rooted in the high degree of 
subunit autonomy which had been previously been a norm in the 
organizational culture. 
Int: When you anticipate departments fighting or failing to cooperate 
among themselves, are you talking about academic departments, opera-
tions departments? 
All of them. For right now we'll go with operations .. . Let me use a spe-
cific, because we just went through this. Financial Aid likes their - and I 
just lost the word for the product they use - Profields, or something like 
that. Either way, they use a different standard database, but their stuff has 
to go into the [new ICT], so when their information is in there registration 
can pull up what they happen to need, and the bookstore can pull up what 
kind of financial aid they're getting. 
Int: That's their database? 
That's what they're using to track their information. And that has to be 
relayed over to the [ICT] for the rest of the college to use it. It's like, "Well, 
no. This works for us, and this is how we want to deal with it." So, it's a 
college issue. 
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Proposition Three 
Visibility alone is insufficient to mitigate unusual routines when they 
provide localized benefits for a subunit. 
How a blame subroutine can camouflage negligence 
Certainly the tactic of shifting responsibility for an operational prob-
lem is not unique to the culture of this research site (and is a general 
characteristic of humans - see the discussion of cognitive dissonance 
and self-attribution bias in Chapter 8). Of interest here is the way the 
evolution of a blame subroutine can institutionalize a problem and 
preserve it, even when the problem is chronic and well recognized. An 
administrator who had worked in the mainframe computer depart-
ment (which the implementation was replacing with end user comput-
ing) described an example of a highly visible, yet chronic, problem. In 
this informant's eyes, the department unjustly suffered, in the form of 
a blame subroutine and a work subroutine, when some faculty sub-
mitted grades after the deadline. 
Grading always had to be in by a certain amount of time. Now, it didn't 
matter that we didn't get the scan sheets [i.e., the optical scanning form on 
which faculty reported grades] on time to go put them in. It was O[ffice of] 
I[nformation] T[echnology]'s problem that [student grades] weren't out. 
Int: Now, you're saying OIT? 
The old OIT, when we were on the mainframe. We used to get scan 
sheets - there's a perfect example - grading, from faculty. They had to be 
out by a certain amount of time, the report cards had to be out by a certain 
amount of time. So, many times we'd schedule - "Hey, we need this in by 
this date" -and half of them [i.e., the scan sheets] weren't even in. 
So we'd go, "Hey, we got two weeks. All right. Let's reschedule that 
whole run again." The grading process was a long run. That was a full 
night run. It was like a five- to six-hour run, with backups and everything 
else that were being upgraded. So we'd schedule that. Let's run it again. 
And of course, half of them didn't give it in, so we had another fifty come 
in. Boom. Let's run the process. Say, "This is the last week to get it in, 
because next week we have to do everything." All right, another twenty-
five come in. So that's just an example, but it goes the same with other 
types of reporting we had to do over there. 
Just because the end user didn't have it in on time- it still meant it was 
OIT's problem. 
174 Organizations and Unusual Routines 
This informant's department was penalized in two ways by this 
UR. First, it bore the cost of a work subroutine, in making multiple 
runs of the term grade job. Worse, it was the target- unjustly, in this 
informant's view - of a blame subroutine which evolved around this 
chronic operational problem. 
How a delay subroutine can protect a perquisite 
Some informants expressed frustration that participants in a group 
process would sometimes appear to deliberately sidetrack the discus-
sion. The head of a large educational service unit viewed group time 
spent laboring over the details of a decision as a necessary task, but 
distinguished this from what s/he saw as tactics designed to stall the 
decision. 
Some people can't focus on the big issue; they get to it by picking at the 
smaller parts of it. You just have to provide time for that. It's part of the 
dynamic of the group, whether that's departmental or part of a larger 
group. Sometimes those details are important. 
Int: Have you been at meetings where you felt that time was being wasted 
over lots of detail? 
No, my frustration in meetings is when you've got an agenda, and you 
think you'll go through these things one, two, three and all of a sudden you 
swing out to a tangential topic of some kind. And people who don't want 
to talk about the agenda item use it as a diversion. Somebody raises a hand 
to get off the topic and somebody else takes it some place else. 
That happens and I find that more frustrating than working on details 
. .. [It's]like being inside a pinball machine. I like to have as few and short 
meetings as possible and you should have some action intended for the 
meeting, whatever it is you came for and get it done. I go to too many meet-
ings and you think, "What did we do besides sit there for an hour?" 
Int: Let me read you a different description [of a hypothetical group 
dynamic] . "The issue is reframed so discussion turns away from the ori-
ginal issue." 
Informer: Yeah, that tends to happen a lot. 
Int: Can you give me examples of where you experienced that? 
It happens in division chair meetings. It will happen sometimes in gov-
ernance and committee meetings ... There are times when people come to 
meetings with alternate agendas. 
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How "good'' decision-making can lead to 
an error subroutine 
175 
Like the grading system, the college's general education policy had 
been the subject of controversy for a considerable period of time prior 
to this study. Perhaps it is in this issue that the product/process dis-
tinction briefly mentioned above is most visible. Informants differed 
sharply in their assessment of this policy and the organizational sys-
tem which resulted from it. Those favoring it spoke approvingly of the 
collegial decision process which generated the policy; those critical 
of it cited its complexity and questioned its educational effectiveness. 
The general education system had been in place for more than a dec-
ade at the time of data collection. A number of the informants had 
been at the college during the time that the system had been designed 
and implemented, and thus could reflect both on the system itself as a 
product and on the process that generated it. At the time of the inter-
views, the issue of the college's general education system had come 
up anew because of the state's desire to facilitate transferability of 
credits. 
To an informant who became a full-time administrator but had 
earlier served as faculty, the existing general education system was 
obviously flawed, despite the support it had enjoyed among faculty. 
This informant was clear in his/her dissatisfaction with that system, 
and the process which generated it. 
I sat on that original general education committee. That was a very long 
time ago. That whole general education model was born out of a desire to 
please everybody, so we ended up with this non-model model, this - you 
know, you can't make a horse out of a camel, which is exactly what we 
tried to do. We limped along with it for years and years and years. 
To this informant, a seriously flawed system came out of the attempt 
to maximize the buy-in of the faculty. 
But basically, in the beginning everyone felt their course should be desig-
nated [i.e., have the broadest applicability to the general education require-
ment] because everyone thought their course was important. So we ended 
up with the designated general education [courses] and the non-designated 
general education. And the non-designated was simply an effort to give a 
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positive label to all those people and all those courses that didn't fit into the 
designated. And nobody - I served on that committee, I felt like I was in 
the twilight zone - nobody wanted to hear that maybe underwater basket 
weaving didn't meet general education requirements. They didn't want to 
hear it. And so this model was created that I don't think served us well over 
the years. It's not clear in the catalog, students didn't really understand it, 
transfer institutions didn't really understand it. 
In stark contrast, the professor who chaired that committee looked 
back on that process as successful collective decision-making. To this 
informant, the major challenge facing the committee was to satisfy 
the concerns of all parties at the table. 
Well, one of the first big leadership experiences I had here was · ... with 
the challenge of creating the college's newest general education policy. It 
was my job to bring the college into compliance with what was then the 
[state's] new general education policy ... There were economic concerns, 
about "what was going to happen to my courses?" There were political 
concerns, in terms of shifts of enrollments from one place in the college to 
another place in the college. There were just layers and layers of things that 
people were worried about when we started to tinker with the general Ed 
policy of the college. 
To this participant, the general education system the group was 
charged with designing had the potential to significantly disrupt the 
existing social order of the college, particularly with regard to power 
and resource allocation. The chief concern of the decision process, 
therefore, was to satisfy the concerns of all at that table; the process 
was successful because this was done. 
Int: And the concern there was that some departments' enrollments would 
be drastically diminished. 
Right. But nobody's was. 
Int: That was a concern. 
That was one of the concerns. 
Int: Were there others, in arriving at that solution? 
Well, yeah. That would have created realignments of power in terms 
of SCH's [student credit hours] among departments. Then there were the 
economic questions. If your - if a course in your department didn't get a 
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certain status in the listing, then you might not need all the faculty you 
have. I mean, there were real economic concerns. 
And then there were the philosophical concerns. What is general edu-
cation, really? So all of those things -political, economic, philosophical -
they were all flying around all the time. And would have to be hammered 
out on a- almost on a course- not almost: on a course-by-course basis ... 
We were trying to address all of what we recognized as serious concerns 
that people brought up to us in the process. So we were trying to respect 
what was at stake, from many points of view. So, I guess we did. 
Despite this informant's favorable assessment of the general educa-
tion system and the process which generated it, another interviewee 
expressed considerable frustration with the system itself, and its resist-
ance to change. General education policy fell under the purview of a 
free-standing committee, apart from the governance structure, and so 
appeared quite buffered from feedback about its decisions. 
Let me give you an example ... [W]e have a system for general education ... 
very atypical to what might be found at other colleges and universities, and 
we use terms that are nonsense terms, like non - what is it? - one general 
education course is called a "designated" general education [course], and 
there's a "nondesignated" general [education course]- which is a nonsense 
term. What's that about? 
And there's all this discussion about general education. And then you have 
this General Education committee, and it seems to be autonomous. People 
get on there, some people don't even know how they get on there, but they 
keep going, and they seem to be dictating how general education happens 
[here]. And no one seems to be able to do anything about getting that com-
mittee changed or influenced. And it's almost an amazing kind of thing, it 
has a life of its own. And yet, here everybody is always complaining about 
the general education system that we have, yet no one seems to be able to 
make that change. 
Proposition Four 
A UR can resist change because its script affirms an ideological tenet 
of the organization, or because it glosses a contradiction in organiza-
tional values. . 
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Inclusion, collegiality, work subroutines, and delay 
subroutines 
As noted above, it may sometimes happen that inclusion, despite its 
merits as an organizational value, fosters delay subroutines in deci-
sion processes. This suggests another interesting paradox: a larger 
decision-making group may be a better enactment of some important 
organizational value, but actually do a poorer job at its task of mak-
ing a decision. A department chair linked the openness and inclusion 
values to delay subroutines: 
Well, I think when you're in college environment there are people who 
believe fundamentally in an open environment, and who believe in collegi-
ality as a fundamental precept of the environment that we live in. And so 
if anything the belief in an open environment, an open discussion, oper-
ates against decision-making because ... we want to involve everybody, we 
want to make sure that nobody's left out, and we want to make sure that 
everybody has been able to present their point of view. So then decision-
making in a college environment is very time-consuming. 
Int: Time-consuming? 
Yeah. It's just not easy to make decisions in a college environment because 
of the commitment to openness and discussion and collegiality. 
Another senior faculty member commented on the way an emphasis 
on inclusion can lead to group process losses. Even though at another 
point in the interview this informant 'was highly critical of a particu-
lar upper-level administrator for moving meetings along too fast and 
allowing too little time for open discussion, s/he still seemed vexed at 
the way committee meetings can spend a good deal of time belabor-
ing details. 
You see it all the time. Nit picking. How many times do you sit at a meeting 
that you agree on a concept of something and spend the next hour and a 
half trying to get it down on paper? People are complaining about should a 
comma go there, or should an 'n' go there. You have that. Also overanalyz-
ing of things. The demand of being on a committee is to look at all these 
kind of things and it happens at all levels. I've seen progress come to a halt 
with only 2-3 people, all the way up, to where small details are blown out 
of proportion. 
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Of particular interest here is her/his point that collegiality requires 
that every comment be given equal consideration in the discussion, 
even comments that are off-topic or of little value in advancing the 
discussion. In this way, the rigorous enactment of an organizational 
value may protect a work or delay subroutine, without any com-
pensating benefit of avoiding an error subroutine. Put another way, 
the group may suffer the process losses of information overload or 
coordination problems without enjoying the process gain of object-
ive evaluation (Nunamaker et al., 1991, p. 46). It is reasonable to see 
such a decision process as having a far greater symbolic benefit to 
the organization (through the ritualized enactment of a key organ-
izational value) than functional benefit (by efficiently reaching a good 
decision). 
At my own department level sometimes we get so hung up on these little 
points that we don't make decisions ... 
Int: Is that damaging to your department? 
It can be at times. It's frustrating because you want to get policy made 
and you leave and you go, "What did we just do for those two hours?" 
Int: And the answer is? 
Nothing .. . 
Int: How is it that the trivial concerns forestall making a decision that 
needs to be made? How come someone doesn't say, "That's trivial, let's 
move on?" 
Because at my department level, everyone has a right to say whatever 
they want. And, no one has the right to say, "Let's move it on" ... It's a 
democracy. We make no decision, but we talked a lot about it. 
Int: So it's taboo for someone to say, "Don't you think that's kind of 
small?" 
Yeah. That would not be respecting your colleague. 
While this passage describes a sort of rigorous egalitarianism fos-
tering delay subroutines, other informants saw the enactment of col-
legiality as a gloss over power. A newly-tenured faculty in the sciences 
described an example of this delay subroutine in his/her department, 
concerning a curriculum issue. Since collegiality was enacted as con-
sensus, a pressing decision on course content could be stalled until all 
faculty members agreed. 
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We have, let's say, three or four faculty members who primarily teach 
A[natomy] and P[hysiology]. And even though we follow the same basic 
curriculum as far as syllabi and objectives go, obviously everybody has 
the latitude to interject their own material ... And so we'll encounter situ-
ations where we're working on objectives, and there'll be discussions as to 
whether we should cover a particular topic. Three faculty members will say 
it absolutely needs to be in, and one faculty member will say, "I don't see 
that it needs to be there," or "I don't have the time to get to this ." Or, "I 
won't be able to cover it." 
So now the problem is that you're trying to reach some level of consist-
ency, because people [i.e., students] are moving on to the nursing program. 
And so, in the lab, for instance, where our [teaching] assistants have to 
teach an agreed-upon curriculum for all the faculty, they're working off 
what are called lab lists, the anatomy that the students need to know. If 
we can't get all four faculty members who teach anatomy to agree on what 
needs to be on that lab list, those guys can't teach it . So the problem is that 
there are times when we want something to be on there, and there may be 
a person who doesn't want it to be, sometimes for nostalgic reasons. That 
blocks that decision. 
Int: And then you just can't move forward with it? 
And that can be very frustrating, and it doesn't go anywhere from 
there. The [teaching] assistants can be frustrated because three people 
are telling them yes, it needs to be there, the fourth person is not. It's 
very difficult to get all those people in a room at one point, so we have 
yearly meetings to try to do just that, and my strategy, my approach now 
has been to float some of these things out there and let them sit for six 
or eight months until they become someone else's idea. And what often-
times happens, then, is that what may generate opposition from one or 
two individuals early on, as they've had the chance to ruminate over it, 
think about it for a while - you often see a very different response a few 
months later. 
Yet another situation that can occur is that, for a variety of rea-
sons, people join a decision process after it has begun. One inform-
ant described the problem this can create for the group leader, when 
the latecomers reopen issues that the group has already resolved. 
The leader must then strike a balance between conflicting impera-
tives: the need to affirm the inclusiveness of group (a core organiza-
tional value), and the need to avoid redundant discussions (a work 
subroutine). 
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Well, I think you don't like to embarrass people but often people come into 
various portions of a decision-making process and they're totally out of 
synch ... I mean, often what they do is they'll bring up something that has 
parts to it. Part of it was discussed six months ago and put to bed very, very 
fairly, but half of what they have to say might be interesting. It's like a new 
comment. And I think, again, the leadership has to decide what to do with 
that, and it has a lot to do with the person, the stake, the expertise they're 
bringing. It has to do, too, with where you are in the decision-making pro-
:ess. I see a lot of that in higher education institutions. 
Representation and process losses 
An important dimension of inclusion, mentioned by some informants, 
was that of representation. At the research site, this value meant that 
decision groups ought to physically include members of all groups 
with even a minor stake in the decision. A junior faculty member 
described an instance of an objection being raised to the legitimacy of 
a decision group on this basis. 
We had a little problem with the structure of this committee that I'm on, 
and someone said, "Look this is not adequately representing the faculty 
across the board, therefore how you can make these decisions?" That's why 
we had a forty-five-person subcommittee to make sure that everybody was 
represented, and no one felt left out. 
It would seem that a rigorous enactment of representation in a 
large organization is likely to create problems both in the function-
ing of a decision group, and in individuals' ability to participate in 
such groups. This informant described a problem of overload, and a 
related delay subroutine, in committees. 
Int: What's your sense of the word "representative?" What does that word 
mean to you? 
Probably the textbook definition is fair, accurate sampling of the group. 
Somebody from that division, from that department. The problem is that 
when you get so big, it becomes ineffective. And the minuscule and minor 
complaints surface, and that hinders the process. 
According to this informant, an open-door policy had not fully sat-
isfied this cultural value. 
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Int: Now, if the door was open for people to attend, and they didn't, why 
would there be a perception that people were excluded? 
You know, somebody said that exact same thing to me as we left that 
meeting. "They're open meetings, anybody could come." I think the prob-
lem is that there are too many damn meetings on the campus. There's no 
time for everybody to be on a committee, there's this, there's that, there's 
the other thing. 
In many ways, it appears that meetings can benefit an organiza-
tion more as an enactment of inclusion and collegiality than as a 
practical method of making decisions. An administrator with con-
siderable work experience in for-profit companies seemed puzzled 
that the organization would invest so much effort in meetings when 
the gain seemed primarily symbolic. Other informants shared this 
perception that oftentimes meetings became work subroutines in 
themselves, giving an appearance of activity but generating little 
useful output. As one put it succinctly, "It's like steering a car with 
no wheels." 
Respecting all stakeholders, and an error subroutine 
A senior faculty member in the humanities described an interesting 
problem in his/her department meetings. Another value current in 
academic environments is that policy decisions must equally pro-
tect the interests of all identifiable stakeholders, even while ignoring 
compelling differences in the relative weight of those interests. This 
informant related how that value often led a group to focus more on 
the outlying cases impacted by the policy than on the essential context 
of the decision. At the outset, this prolonged the deliberations. In the 
end, the group might be unsuccessful in finding a way to account for 
the exceptional cases, and create a workaround to the policy. Here, 
again, there are indications of work and error subroutines. 
Like when the faculty get together in my department, we're affecting thou-
sands of students, or we're affecting eighteen to twenty adjunct faculty, 
and what we're so afraid of doing is causing disruption in their lives. We 
want to look at it as closely as possible. Sometimes we get too narrow and 
we spend too much time on an issue that could affect maybe two or three 
students. At most. 
The vision is that there's a great deal of desire to come up with the perfect 
decision. We want to come up with something that will not harm anyone, 
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and there is the desire to come up with the perfect decision. And what ends 
up happening is that you start to focus on the exceptions. And you don't 
look at - you spend an inordinate amount of time on it. It prolongs the 
decision-making process. Does it change it? I don't think so, most of the 
time. We will write, "There will be an exception to this policy. Here is how 
to change it." 
Int: Besides delaying, does it ever lead to a bad decision? 
Sometimes it leaves it too broad, too general. It becomes too encompass-
ing and therefore has no meaning. 
An administrator voiced a similar observation about a standing 
committee s/he served on. The committee had spent a great deal of 
time deliberating about the college's policy on smoking, and in the 
end adopted a recommendation which many, including this inform-
ant, felt would be ineffectual. 
We have met on that issue [the policy on smoking], and that issue alone, 
for almost two years. 
Int: So, what do you do? 
We go there and discuss surveys and people's opinions, and make no 
decisions. 
Int: Do you ever generate a recommendation? 
I think we finally did. 
Int: Finally? 
I think we just made a recommendation, but it's so watered down. We 
try to water our recommendations down so much so that they make every-
one happy, that they're no longer meaningful. I find quite often a meeting 
[here] is a meeting to compromise and make everybody happy. And you 
just can't make everybody happy. There's got to be some winners. There's 
got to be some losers. Here, we want everybody to be a winner. We all can't 
be winners. And it's not in the sense of winner and losing, it's just that 
sometimes your opinions mean something, sometimes they don't. 
Student-centeredness, and a work subroutine 
Another example of a UR linked to an organizational value surfaced 
in the interview with a newly-tenured faculty in the sciences. While 
this informant in no way denigrated the organizational value of 
>tudent-centeredness, s/he made note of an elaborate work subroutine 
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(and, technically, an error subroutine) which had evolved around 
enacting that value. It seems likely that this routine will be familiar to 
most academicians. 
If a student is unhappy about a particular grade, and wants to take a very 
unrealistic concern to the nth degree, they have the opportunity to do that 
because they're the student. A student who's got a 40 on everything that 
they've ever scored, who knows in writing that a passing average must be 
65, being allowed to go from department chair to division chair to dean to 
a hearing, potentially. All of which is a tremendous waste of time, recog-
nizing of course that the student needs to have a forum. 
If they're being treated unfairly there needs to be a process in place. But 
at the same time, if it's clear that things have been handled entirely pro-
fessionally, for the best interests of the student, there's no reason why just 
because the student is a student or a customer, that the student should be 
allowed to just continue to get away with something like that. 
To this informant, the meticulous enactment of student-centeredness 
had also fostered an error subroutine in which the course grade may 
sometimes be an unreliable measure of a student's performance. 
We'll have students ... who will come in and say, "Well, Doc, I've passed 
every other course I've ever taken here. I've got a 4.0. I can't understand 
why I'm just getting a B in anatomy," or "I'm just getting a B in organic 
chemistry. What is it that's happening now that's giving me this problem?" 
And so, these oftentimes are the students who want every advantage. 
They'll complain to the department chair or the division chair, "I don't 
understand why it's so difficult." 
There's some level of, we're here to please the student, we're here to do 
what's best for the student, but the student is allowed to push that beyond 
what is realistic, beyond what is necessary, beyond what is in some cases 
professional. It encroaches on that student-professor relationship. And 
because that can happen across campus, the students have learned by habit 
that they can try these things, do some of these kinds of things. They may 
have learned that in high school and it's worked for them. They whine to 
their professor, their grade changes. 
The problem of dominance and power relations 
in open meetings 
While the college's governance system was designed to offer 
every organization member the opportunity to participate in 
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decision-making, and it did appear to be an important symbol of 
this organizational value, a surprising number of the informants saw 
problems in its routine functioning. Nunamaker et al. (1991, p. 49) 
noted that group process losses sometimes tended to rise as the group 
size increased, and it may be that the problems informants mentioned 
were simply endemic to a decision group which, at least in its charter 
if not the actual attendance at its meetings, was as large as the entire 
payroll of the organization. 
A number of faculty informants indicated they did not always feel 
free to express their views candidly at meetings because of pressure, 
not from administrators, but from their peers. Here, again, is a para-
dox: although the meetings were clearly an important symbol of 
openness as an organizational value, some participants did not per-
ceive them as safe places in which to speak. (This problem resembles 
the process losses Nunamaker et al. called conformance pressure and 
domination (1991, p. 46), and Dutton's analysis of how avowedly 
participatory online discussions can end up stifling participation 
(1996).) 
A senior faculty member in the humanities described how a struc-
ture intended to promote open discussion actually inhibited it. It is 
worth noting that this informant had been tenured for a good num-
ber of years, yet still felt some degree of intimidation from his/her 
colleagues. 
I've had a person in my department say something in (the general meeting 
of the college governance] that that person thought, and was called on the 
carpet afterwards by one of the more senior faculty. 
Int: Wow. 
Oh, yeah. 
lnt: So much for free speech, eh? 
Oh, also on votes. "Why did you vote that way?" 
Int: You're kidding! 
Show of hand votes? (whistles]. So I usually sit behind the person who 
wants to watch me, I sit directly behind the person. So if they really want 
to watch me they have to turn all the way around- and they do. 
Sadly, this informant saw no venue in which the participants could 
be free in sharing their perspectives about controversial issues. 
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And there is no forum to hear all the voices. There is no place because of 
the tenure structure, and the politics of the department, and everything 
else. There's no place to have that discussion that feels safe to people. 
A junior faculty member in a different academic department also 
noted this degree of risk in expressing oneself in a public space. 
I guess it's because I think people are- it's sort of like politicians are afraid 
often to cast votes even if their vote's in favor of something they believe 
in, because they may be afraid that those votes might be used against 
them in some way. I guess it's just the fear of going on the record about 
something. 
This sentiment was not confined to the faculty ranks, nor was it 
based only on a fear of a specific reprisal. An administrator described 
a reluctance to risk a loss of face in the general meeting: 
There's just so much resistance to change and the new people and the 
younger people. I mean, when I became the director of [names department], 
I was the youngest director here. And I was very intimidated to speak up, 
because you've got these big bullies who know what's going on, who'd be, 
"Looka here little miss, I've been here a lot longer than you and I can tell 
you that it's not going to work, what you're saying" ... Somebody really let 
me have it ... I never saw governance as a place that I can be honest. 
While a number of informants described this problem in the gov-
ernance meetings, it did not appear to be confined to that structure. 
The head of a large academic unit saw this process loss diminishing 
the effectiveness of its internal meetings: 
One of the dynamics which I think is a very unfortunate one is that junior 
staff, junior people, can often feel their career is going to be affected and 
on the line if they cross a senior person who has tenure, might even be in a 
position to influence their career one way or the other ... so that there's a 
reluctance to sometimes come right out in the open with how you feel 
about something if that's going to cross somebody whose investment is in 
a different outcome. A very unfortunate dynamic. 
A new faculty member in another department put it succinctly: "I'm 
not tenured. I don't want to rock the boat." 
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To state the problem concisely, if perhaps a bit cynically, the large 
decision groups often seem to benefit a complex organization more 
as ritualistic enactments of openness than they do as processes 
which generate gains in stimulation, synergy, or objective evaluation 
(Nunamaker et al., 1991, p. 46) through actual freedom to openly 
share ideas. Given that such large groups consume considerable time 
and effort, they sometimes can better be understood as work and 
delay subroutines fostered by symbolic purposes than as collaborative 
decision-making. 
Ideology and change resistance 
At first glance it might seem that change resistance is rooted in what-
ever personal advantages or privileges the status quo confers. While 
localized benefits do appear to be one dimension of change resistance 
in URs, another dimension is the connection of current practices to 
underlying beliefs. This linkage of operational procedures to ideo-
logical tenets seems to create a powerful inertial force in an organ-
ization. The head of a large academic unit described the way even 
minor procedural change could be blocked in large group decision 
processes. 
Well, I'm being pretty candid here because of confidentiality, but it's like if 
you - when you operationalize your beliefs, your principles of your profes-
sion into certain practices, the notion that the practices in place are immut-
able, and if you alter the practices in any way, even if you modernize them, 
to certain people you inherently and implicitly violate the beliefs. 
That's not a true statement, a logical statement. So that any modern-
ization or alteration in how you deliver your service, which might even be 
an enhancement of that service, automatically in some people's thinking, 
becomes a violation of the tenets and beliefs that underpin your profession 
or your service. And some folks will argue that line, which is just patently 
not true. 
Any change has a suspect purpose to it, and it's all a grand scheme ... it's 
almost a suspicion rather than a comprehension that some of these things 
might be for everybody's benefit. Some are not, obviously. Not all change is 
good change. There's an inability to discriminate, and then to differentiate 
that you can change some things and still preserve the best of what you're 
doing and your basic principles. 
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A mid-level administrator likewise lamented that there were anum-
ber of institutional practices which had become, in his/her words, 
"big sacred things." In this informant's eyes, certain practices needed 
to be re-examined but open discussion was impossible. The organ-
ization thus might be capable of single-loop learning, but not double-
loop learning. 
A staff member described a work subroutine in a standing com-
mittee of the governance structure. This informant sat on the com-
mittee charged with resolving policy issues concerning educational 
standards. The work subroutine resulted when the specific questions 
referred to the committee became tied to the broad educational phil-
osophy of the college, an area beyond the scope of the committee. 
This passage illustrates the way discussion of comparatively narrow 
operational or procedural issues can become linked to broad ques-
tions of institutional values and ideology, and thus become impossible 
to resolve even as their consideration uses up a great deal of time. 
While URs may become change resistant because subunits which are 
functionally related are only loosely coupled, URs may also result 
when subunits or issues which are functionally unrelated become 
tightly coupled. 
Yes, I've been in meetings where we go over and over and over the same 
things and don't get anyplace. That was happening last year in educa-
tional standards, because everything that came back to us was educational 
philosophy. If we recommended a change, we were really talking about 
changing the philosophy, and we really thought we should discuss the phil-
osophy before we made changes that changed [the philosophy] without 
knowing we changed it. 
Because we were coming around to the philosophy thing and we're gonna 
say this is what our philosophy is, we cannot change, should not change A, 
B, C and D until we looked back at the philosophy. So, there was a lot of 
getting nowhere even though it was airing things. 
A senior faculty member recounted a similar situation in faculty 
association meetings, but saw it instead as a positive feature of the 
discussion. In this informant's perspective, the delay in considering 
the scheduled agenda item is offset by the benefit of time spent dis-
cussing important philosophical issues. Perhaps this informant's view 
of that turn in a decision group reflects the high value faculty, with 
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their primary university role as educators and analysts, place on rais-
ing questions and defining issues. 
Again, most of the meetings I go to are faculty association meetings. And 
at those meetings we discuss a number of policies- grading, [the new ICT], 
things like that. It often turns out that something like grading policy gets 
tied to a greater issue, like some more broad policy of how the faculty relates 
to the students, where the first issue is really a subset. Sometimes the ori-
ginal discussion needs to be postponed until the more broad issue has been 
resolved. That happens a lot in an open debate situation. Where there's a 
problem or a concern and someone raises it, this type of discussion really 
focuses or brings more clearly to mind, what the major issues really are. 
A faculty member in the arts recalled his/her first impressions of 
department and division meetings at the college. This informant, like 
others, saw a connection between shared beliefs (or perhaps a nostal-
gia for the idealized past when beliefs were widely shared) and change 
resistance in the organization at that time. 
[This has been] my seventh year here. And when I arrived, I was one of 
the few new people on this campus. Everybody else had been here for an 
eternity. And one of the things that I noticed was that in our department, 
we always ended up talking about the way things were rather than the way 
things could be ... Even within the division meetings, it was constantly, 
"Well, we've always done it this way. It's important for us to look at it this 
way. It's important to think about it this way." So, yes- I was very struck 
by the inflexibility of many people. 
Int: Inflexibility? 
[The belief that] it was very special, and it was the way it should be, and 
this is what makes us unique, and so why would we look at it differently? 
Given the tight linkage of core beliefs and operational practices, 
this informant seemed a bit surprised that such a large policy change 
as the grading system could eventually occur, the work subroutine 
notwithstanding. 
Again, I go back to the idea that in the past there was not that much room 
for change, and it was because of those core values. Even when we started 
talking about the grading change, we went into the idea of educational phil-
osophy and that seemed to hold us up for quite a bit ... But we did change. 
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Contradictions, opposing perspectives, 
and ideological myths 
In some interviews there were indications that URs had evolved as 
ways for the organization to cope with contradictions in values. (These 
dynamics reflect Eisenberg's (1984) point that ambiguity in values or 
beliefs can sometimes benefit an organization.) A number of inform-
ants mentioned "student-centeredness" as an essential organizational 
value, but differed quite sharply in how that value ought to be enacted 
in the daily operation of the college, with some questioning whether 
this value was anything more than an ideological myth. 
A junior faculty member in the arts seemed to be an especially keen 
observer of this aspect of the organizational dynamics. Perhaps, as 
a newcomer to the college, s/he had not yet fully acculturated to the 
organizational environment, so that any contradictions in the belief 
system were still identifiable, if not downright vivid. This inform-
ant noted a difference in the administrative perspective and faculty 
perspective on the nature of student-centeredness. The college had 
recently begun offering a small number of courses in a short, inten-
sive semester. This informant expressed reservations about the educa-
tional benefit to the individual student of such courses, but noted that 
these courses had proven quite popular. 
Is it best for the enrollment? Yeah. How can a three-week term be best for 
the student? All of that stuff is in your short-term memory .. . You're gonna 
forget more than what you remember. 
So, I'm not so sure that the decisions are in the best interests of the stu-
dents. Or are they more in the best interests of FTE [full time enrollment], 
which is really the lifeblood? If you offer a course that's finished in three 
weeks, will you get people to take it? Absolutely. 
What accountability for the people who leave? We should have a high 
accountability. Do we just cram in what is usually offered in fifteen weeks? 
I don't understand that. "Here's a chapter, read it. We're gonna talk about 
it tomorrow, we're gonna have a test about it on Wednesday, then we're 
gonna start the next one and have a test on Thursday." ... I don't see how 
it's beneficial in the long run to the students. It's beneficial to the institu-
tion, but not to the students. 
An administrator also saw contradictions in core institutional 
beliefs and their enactment. The informant saw one particular belief 
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in particular as supporting change-resistant URs that imposed costs 
on students: 
I think there is a core belief that [the research site] is somehow different 
than other places, and somehow better. And while I think [this] is an extra-
ordinary place- I love being here, and I worked at [another college] for ten 
years ... I've got to tell you something. I didn't see any difference between 
the quality of the student coming out of [the other college] than I do the 
student coming out of [here]. 
This informant felt the belief in the organization's superiority pre-
served a number of work and error subroutines that imposed costs 
on students, despite the professed organizational value of student-
centeredness. In this informant's description, when work or error 
subroutines in value chains involving students were called into 
question in the form of a comparison to corresponding practices at 
other educational institutions, the critique that the local practices 
were deficient (in the language of this study, were URs) was fre-
quently rebutted by the professed belief in overall organizational 
superiority regarding student-centeredness. In essence, supporters 
of the status quo took a position along the line of "we're differ-
ent because we're better." (As described in Chapter 8, this seems a 
clear case of an organizational-level drive to reduce cognitive dis-
sonance.) An observer might expect that such a deeply held value as 
student-centeredness would generate considerable discussion in the 
general meetings. Yet, this informant felt there was something of a 
taboo against openly problematizing some work and error subrou-
tines s/he saw violating that value. 
Proposition Five 
A cultural environment which places a high value on inclusion will 
tend to support double binds. 
Inclusive decision-making and its discontents 
As noted above, inclusion appe~red to be one of the strongest organ-
izational values at the research site, manifest as a tradition that major 
policy decisions and documents will be collective works. It is diffi-
cult to over-emphasize the strength of this value in the culture of this 
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organization, and it seems this is true of higher education in general. 
The co-chair of the college's most recent accreditation self-study sum-
marized it concisely: 
And if there was one thing you learned [here], that was where it all began 
and ended. When [the other co-chair of the self-study] and I did [the 
accreditation report] we had one goal, and that was to make sure that 
everyone was valued, included, affirmed. 
However admirable this value may be in itself, it seemed to put 
leaders of decision groups in a double-bind situation. They must guide 
the group toward the efficient completion of its task, while simul-
taneously enacting the inclusion and collegiality values sufficiently 
to maintain the group's legitimacy within the organization's culture. 
The comment of a senior faculty member illustrated how high the 
expectation could be: 
A good discussion leader steers the discussion back on track. So, if you're 
having a discussion about, say, something like setting a policy or making 
a rule or something like that, if the discussion starts to wander away from 
the central issue and gets sidetracked on a little detail- or maybe really off 
on a tangent - that discussion leader has to drag the discussion back, and 
has to know how to do it so that nobody feels like they've been tossed out 
on their ear. 
Int: That would seem to me to be a difficult task. 
Maybe. But that's what committee chairs are supposed to do. That's 
their job, and if they can't do it they shouldn't be committee chairs. It's as 
simple as that. 
Informants often identified the college governance as the place 
where they had seen UR scripts played out. Governance occupied a 
special niche in the belief system of the organization because it was the 
structure through which all organization members could participate in 
collaborative policy decisions. Decisions made in governance were, by 
its charter, advisory to but not binding on the executive management 
of the college. Still, organization members expected college executives 
to take the recommendations adopted in governance very seriously. 
Inclusiveness was a key feature of the governance structure. 
Standing committees within governance had specified quotas of mem-
bers from the various constituencies of the college (i.e., faculty, staff, 
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administration, and students) so as to guarantee representation on 
them. Moreover, all members of the organization, including students, 
were invited to participate in monthly college-wide meetings called 
governance forums. The large group meetings were open to all who 
chose to attend, and a good deal of time was devoted to open discus-
sion of policy issues before votes were taken on them. In sum, it would 
seem fair to view this collegial decision mechanism as an almost ide-
alized enactment of the strong organizational value of inclusion. 
Why was it, then, that so many organization members considered 
its actual workings as problematic, in one way or another? A senior 
faculty member pointed to a process loss related to group size (similar, 
but not identical, to the loss Nunamaker et al. identified as air time 
fragmentation (1991, p. 46)) and hinted at the difficulty the group 
leader might face in trying to avoid it: 
Well first of all, the more people you have the more agendas you have of 
people, and the more people want to talk, and not necessarily discuss what 
is the central issue or even the issue that is at hand, or anything that's 
relevant. So I mean, you have to expect that people want to talk and you 
have to let them talk. You can't be autocratic about it. But sometimes that 
discussion veers off to something else that someone may raise. They'll say, 
"What about this? We didn't consider that." And are those germane to 
really what decision has to be made, or even what the problem is? 
A junior faculty member observed a delay subroutine in a standing 
committee of the college governance: 
And given that it was a detailed project that involved probably twenty to 
twenty-five committee members, it often happened that in the course of 
trying to reach that detailed document someone would raise an issue or 
make a point that was within his or her own area but which wasn't in 
anybody else's. And so it seemed that we would spend a lot of time giving 
that person a chance to air their idea or their question or their problem in 
ways that struck, I think, a lot of people as being kind of off the point of 
the larger goal that we were trying to reach. I think that happens with some 
regularity at the college. 
But a delay subroutine may not be simply the unfortunate byproduct 
of an institutional value (in this case, a simple process loss related to 
group size). It is also possible that a long, drawn-out discussion may 
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be in some parties' strategic interest in a controversy. As Proposition 
Three suggests, a UR may persist because it does benefit certain actors. 
A junior faculty member raised the possibility that the inclusion value 
sometimes was used, via a delay subroutine, to prevent change and 
maintain the status quo: 
And I also think that there are frankly some people interested in keeping 
the process going for as long as possible because that means it will never 
get changed and they don't want the grading system to change. I'm not 
thinking of anybody here specifically, but I know that that attitude exists 
in the college community and so the longer this debate goes on without a 
resolution the happier they are. 
Int: So you're saying that it may be that for some people talking, and talk-
ing, and talking about it is a strategic maneuver. 
It's a strategic maneuver to avoid resolution. 
Another informant, a senior faculty member who had become a 
full-time administrator, described a work subroutine that could arise 
around representation as the enactment of inclusion: 
Everyone wants to be able to give their two cents on an issue, on the ques-
tion before it moves anywhere - and that usually has to do with who's been 
involved, who's had an opportunity. One of the objections, for example, 
to the committee that was going to look at [educational] practices was that 
it was a voluntary thing, "Who wants to do this?" A lot of people volun-
teered. There were some areas where no one volunteered. 
So the issue now became around should there be equal representation on 
it? It's voluntary, anyone who wants to, can. "Oh, but some people didn't, 
and they will be left out, and shouldn't they be involved? And shouldn't we 
give them another opportunity?" And after a while your eyes glass over 
and you say, look, you give them the opportunity, they don't want to do it, 
tough. If it doesn't come out to their liking, that's it. Again, the guardian 
of total involvement. 
This informant clearly was vexed by delay subroutines created as 
the college's inclusion value was enacted in the college-wide govern-
ance. While s/he appeared willing to trade off a certain degree of 
inclusion for relief from the process loss its rigorous enactment gener-
ated, that remedy would open the group up to criticism from others 
who would rather trade off the delay in moving the decision along for 
the sake of maximizing inclusion or openness. 
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The problem of leadership in an inclusive organization 
This tension between the need for efficiency in group decision-making 
and the need to satisfactorily enact this fundamental organizational 
value posed a challenge for group leaders. A number of informants, 
when asked about problems in group processes, faulted the leaders 
of those groups for the work or delay subroutines in those processes. 
Other informants, however, complained that college administration 
dictated policy and failed to adequately involve faculty in decisions. 
Perhaps it is ironic that the commonly used phrase, "strong leader-
ship," can simultaneously have such different meanings, and that 
inclusion can foster blame subroutines. 
The comments of a junior faculty member on a recent revision 
of the policy concerning incomplete grades offer some insights into 
this culturally-induced double bind. It is interesting to note that the 
informant seemed aware of the conflicting expectations. 
And that's when you get in a situation, again, a catch-22. You need strong 
leadership, but you need strong leadership that is open to suggestions. The 
vice president has written a policy on incomplete [grades). That wasn't 
given to any committee, it didn't go through [the governance] steering com-
mittee, but [s/he] wrote it. [S/he] went around to other colleges, got their 
language, used part of our [existing policy's]language, wrote it, and said, 
"Here it is!" That's strong leadership. 
But, what it shouldn't be is, "Here it is, here's the policy." Rather it 
should be, "Here it is, let's talk about it." We'll spend a day - one day, 
that's it - talking about it. You go back, consider it, next time we'll 
meet we'll have a discussion. We'll vote or come up with alternative 
plans. That's part of the process, it's not, "Duck! Here comes the next 
policy." 
But again you've got to have something there, and it sounds like I'm con-
tradicting myself, but you need to have somebody saying, "I'm in charge, 
this is the way it's going to be." But not sitting up there as the benevolent 
dictator saying, "Here is the new policy. Adopt it!" Let's have a discussion 
about the policy. And I don't know if that's happened. 
A senior faculty member in the humanities was quite blunt about 
his/her perception that the group decision process in the governance 
meetings was often no more than a gloss over the exercise of execu-
tive power: 
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I don't think that the upper-level administration is frank and honest. 
Decisions are made and we're made to think that our input has influence 
in making those decisions. There are times when we're misled. The grading 
change was an example. I was told before the conversation became public 
that the grading system was going to change. And that it was a done deal. 
Int: Told by whom? 
By an upper-level administrator. 
By no means was the discontent with collective decision processes 
universal among this study's informants, however. The head of a large 
department within educational services spoke very positively about 
both governance and other collegial processes. It is interesting to note 
that this informant saw the discontent as rooted in a fundamental dis-
agreement about the appropriate role of these collective processes in 
policy formation. This informant saw the collective process as advis-
ory to the college executives, and was satisfied that those executives 
seriously considered that input. Others, in the view of this informant, 
expected the collective process to culminate in a referendum, with the 
majority vote binding on the executives. 
A senior faculty member in the sciences saw the organizational con-
text as requiring a kind of ritualistic behavior by all parties for the 
sake of enacting the institutional value of inclusiveness - albeit at the 
cost of generating work subroutines: 
I don't think [the college president] lies and I certainly would never accuse 
[the academic vice-president] of doing that ... But again when [the presi-
dent] responded yes to Prof. L, that we would not change the grading sys-
tem if the faculty votes no, I didn't believe [it]. They spent a lot of money 
on installing [the new ICT] on the basis of the grading system and other 
things that would go along with that, and it was clear that it was going to 
be implemented. 
I was on the committee [which reviewed the grading policy] the previous 
summer and it was pretty clear that no matter what we came up with the 
school was going to do what it wanted to do anyway. One could say that 
was lying and misleading. I would like to think that [the president] was 
engaging the faculty, and that's very generous. But [s/he] had to do some-
thing and that was the way of doing it. My experience is that I was wasting 
my time but somebody had to be on the committee. 
So, when you say lie, there are techniques one needs to use when one is 
a leader and if the troops are politically sensitive or experienced, they will 
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Example from the case 
• elaborate grade appeals 
• elaborate system planning documents, subse-
quently ignored 
• extensive face-to-face meetings 
• formation of additional subcommittees 
• group editing of paper forms 
• group lacking appropriate decision power 
• incompatibilities in formats of shared data 
• need to validate the representativeness of 
committee 
• policy review requiring reexamination of core 
values 
• procurement paperwork and interdepartmental 
han doffs 
• student testing during admissions process 
• unproductive meetings as symbols of inclusion 
• consensus required for department 's curriculum 
revision 
• continuing to add representatives to decision 
group 
• deliberate diversion from meeting agenda 
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• extensive discussion, from everyone, as enactment 
Error 
of collegiality 
• inclusion, and personal agendas 
• indecision in transferring data to new system 
• miscommunication between users and tech 
support 
• non-responsiveness to messages 
• prolonged discussion of issue as a tactic to fore-
stall decision 
• revision of general education policy 
• revision of grading policy 
• slow response to demand for courses 
• bad fit of course availability to demand 
• belief in institutional uniqueness precluding 
change 
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Table 5.2 (cont.) 
Subroutine 
Blame 
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Example from the case 
• dominance in open meetings 
• idiosyncratic general education policy 
• inefficient distribution of computing machinery 
• late registration of international students 
• poor linkage of course sections to number of full-
time faculty 
• miscommunication between users and tech 
support 
• missed deadlines for payroll information 
• overweighting exceptional cases in policy 
decisions 
• permanent linkage of current practices to core 
values, "sacred cows" 
• attempting to please all stakeholders 
• agenda-driven meetings seen as managerial control 
• claims that information was not shared 
• conflict between operations and academic units 
• executive decisions seen as illegitimate power 
• group decision process seen as gloss on executive 
power 
• late reporting of grades 
• scapegoating mainframe computing department and 
tech support 
recognize that this is a charade and what is going to happen is going to hap-
pen despite the input. But this is a very reasonable way to make everyone 
feel good to have their input, keeps the waters smooth and the interaction 
open and friendly. Therefore it's acceptable to people. 
In short, this informant believed the relational benefit of the pro-
cess (through engaging organization members) outweighed its cost 
(in generating a work subroutine). Further, the informant viewed the 
college president's actions in a double-bind situation as evidence of 
leadership skill, rather than ethical deficiency. 
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Conclusion 
Table 5.2 summarizes examples of the primary URs identified in the 
fieldwork of the case. The table should not be understood as a meas-
urement of the communication climate of the research site, or as cri-
tique of interactions at the site. For us, perhaps the biggest discovery 
from this field study was the intimate connection between organiza-
tional culture and unusual routines, with their associated interaction 
scripts. The next chapter will show how we incorporated these elem-
ents into a revised model. 
